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Introduction 
Published between 1913 and 1927, Marcel Proust’s seven-volume novel, In Search of 
Lost Time, not only explores the depths and limitations of involuntary memory, but it also exists 
as a fundamental text for critics invested in literary representations of memory theory.  Heavily 
influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson, Proust argues that remembrance of the past is 
inherently altered and unreliable and that memory, and human consciousness more generally, are 
best understood through methods of introspection and intuition, rather than by scientific 
explanation.  Referred to by some as Proustian Memory, this theory explicates both the revision 
that takes place in the act of remembering as well as the inherent fictionality of these 
recollections.  However, nearly two-hundred years earlier, Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy 
(1759-1764) hints at some of the same claims regarding the degree to which the past can be 
reconstructed.  Deeply concerned with how and to what extent the past can be regenerated, 
Sterne’s novel not only illuminates how memories are altered, but it proposes that under certain 
environmental conditions, short-term memory is more susceptible to modification. 
1. A Brief Historical Overview of Memory Theory 
 To understand both Proust’s approach to memory as well as Sterne’s utilization of it in 
Tristram Shandy, it is first important to explore a brief history of the theory of memory and some 
of its developments over time.  According definition 6a. in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
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“memory” is defined as “The faculty by which things are remembered; the capacity for retaining, 
perpetuating, or reviving the thought of things past.”  Although this definition of memory dates 
back to Chaucer in 1380, it is one that continues to be used today.  Because memory deals 
explicitly with “retaining, perpetuating, or reviving” the past, this mental faculty has been a main 
concern for a broad host of scholars ranging from philosophers to scientific researchers. One way 
these intellectuals have tried to explain the interworkings of memory is to call upon several 
useful metaphors ranging from a wax tablet, to a mirror, to a storehouse of ideas.  One of the 
earliest of these memory metaphors is that of the wax tablet, invoked by Plato in Theaetetus: “ 
Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory … and that when we wish to remember 
anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to 
the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from 
the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image 
lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not 
know.” (n.p) 
For Plato, memory functions like hot wax where images of the past are “imprinted” and held for 
“as long as the image lasts.”  In addition to Plato’s metaphor, in his 1774 version of “An Essay 
on Genius,” Alexander Gerard explains that memory is like a mirror that “reflects images of the 
objects formerly perceived by us,” and that “It is in its nature a mere copier” (28,9).  Here, 
similar to Plato’s image of the impression stamped on hot wax, Gerard imagines memory as a 
fixed reflection of the past that functions as a “mere copier” in order to reproduce the original 
image. Lastly, in 1798 Maria Edgeworth adds, “the memory resembles a storehouse, in which we 
should early lay up facts,” so that they “will afterwards be ready for service at our summons” 
(345,6).  Each of these metaphors—the wax seal, the mirror, and the storehouse—imply that 
memory is a reliable imprint or copy of the past and can easily be accessed through the act of 
remembrance.   
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 Amidst these various metaphors aimed at shedding light on the process and capabilities 
of memory, a theory of memory as unreliable and susceptible to error emerged in the late 1600s 
with the scholarship of John Locke.  Although philosophers such as Plato and Descartes were 
also invested in the revision of memories, Locke’s work launched this perspective into the 
foreground.  In 1690, Locke wrote, “The Memory is very weak, such Ideas quickly fade, and 
vanish quite out of the Understanding, and leave it as clear without any Foot-steps, or remaining 
Characters, as Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they 
never had been there” (65).  Unlike the previous metaphors that imagined the memory as capable 
of reproducing an exact replica of the past, Locke points to the weakness of memory, suggesting 
that in the instances where memory is able to reconstruct the past, its reproductions are “weak,” 
and mere “Shadows” of the previous original.  In this way, Locke argues for the unreliability of 
memory as well as its inability to recreate a stable, unaltered version of the original past.  Since 
Locke’s exposition of memory as inherently unreliable, other theorists have supported Locke’s 
views as well as discredited many of the earlier metaphors for memory.  For example, aiming 
criticism at the idea that memory works like a wax seal or a mirror that produces an exact image 
of the past, Martin A. Conway explains that “Memories are records of people’s experiences of 
events and are not a record of events themselves, In this respect, they are unlike recording media 
such as videos or audio recordings, to which they should not be compared” (368). Here, Conway 
not only suggests that memory is subject to biases resulting from personal experience, but he 
urges readers to refrain from using forms of media recording as a means for understanding the 
way that memory functions.  Furthermore, Lynn Nadel and Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong argue, 
“stable memories can be altered when they are reactivated.  That is, memory is fundamentally 
malleable…The most important implication is that when memories are replayed…this process of 
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reactivating and replaying a memory inalterably changes it going forward” (5).  Much like 
Locke’s warning about the unreliability of memory, Nadel and Sinnott-Armstrong agree that 
memories are easily altered, or revised, once they are recalled.  Not only do these claims focus 
attention on both the malleability and fallible nature of memory, but they also suggest that “Truth 
preservation is not the primary function of memory.  In the first instance, memory is meant to 
preserve content rather than truth” (Bernecker 215).  Hence, through a very brief and broad 
exploration of the ways that memory has been examined and explained throughout a brief 
history, it is clear that there exists a tension between understanding memory either as an 
authentic reproduction or a revised reconstruction of the past.   
2. Proustian Memory       
With a broad historical context concerning the unreliable and altered nature of memory 
now set in place, a turn to Proust and his literary contributions to the field of neuroscience is an 
important stepping stone before venturing into Sterne’s own contributions in Tristram Shandy.  
Building off of scholars like Nadel, Sinnott-Armstrong, Bernecker, and Conway, Jonah Lehrer 
argues that through the act of writing, Proust developed a theory of memory that imagined the 
inherent act of remembering as a revisionary process.  Rather than reconstructing a moment from 
the past exactly as it occurred, Proust believed that the resulting memory was an altered version 
of the original event.  Similar to Locke, for Proust, memories were always shades of reality 
rather than recreations of the past.  Lending to this view of memory as something newly created 
rather than simply reproduced, Cretien Van Campen in his book, The Proust Effect: The Senses 
as Doorways to Lost Memories suggest that “A memory is more of a construction than a 
reconstruction: memories never reconstruct the past precisely, but add elements from different 
moments in a person’s life” (56) and thus, memory is closely related to the “creative process that 
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is experienced by an artist” (57). Moreover, Lehrer suggests that Proust not only divorced 
memories from reality, but that he also viewed them as unreliable: “Simply put, he believed that 
our recollections were phony.  Although they felt real, they were actually elaborate fabrications” 
(82).  Like the artist’s ability to conjure images that appear to reflect reality, Proust believed that 
memories were recreations that seemed authentic to the past, but were actually revised 
reproductions of it.  
Proust illustrates these concerns with memory in the first volume of his novel, In Search 
of Lost Time, where in tasting a madeleine cookie dipped in tea, the narrator is immediately 
overcome by childhood nostalgia.   As a result, Proust’s narrator plunges into an exploration of 
the capacity of memory and the human mind: 
I put down the cup and examine my own mind.  It alone can discover the truth.  
But how: What an abyss of uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by 
itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the dark region through which it 
must go seeking and where all its equipment will avail it nothing.  Seek? More 
than that: create. (1) 
Bringing the past into focus through an examination of his own mind, Proust’s narrator points to 
the mind and memory as “an abyss of uncertainty” and “the dark region,” emphasizing its 
inability to draw forth clear, reliable accounts of the past.  Additionally, referring to memory as 
an “abyss” or a “dark region” further suggests the gap between reality and reconstructed 
memories, as well as points to memory’s susceptibility to error.  Proust’s repetition of the words 
“seeker,” “seeking,” and “Seek” also reinforce this idea in an attempt to show the difficulties of 
rendering a truly accurate account of the past.  But just as he suggests that conjuring the past 
through memory is unreliable, he does acknowledges the moment of recall as one of creation. 
Proust illustrates the creative powers of memory in its ability to reconstruct a scene from his 
childhood, “the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into 
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being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea” (3). Furthermore, despite the constant 
seeking for that past reality and an apparent connection to his past, the narrator admits that “all 
its equipment will avail it nothing.” Lastly, by reconstructing a moment from the past, Proust 
declares that the mind and memory not only seeks but that it must do “More than that: create,” 
emphasizing that the act of remembering both searches for and crafts the past in a way that is less 
authentic than the original moment.  Hence, just as Lehrer suggests, Proust recognizes that “Our 
memories are not like fiction.  They are fiction” (88). 
3. Slawkenbergius’ Tale:  A True or False Nose? 
 Although nearly two hundred years earlier than Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, 
Lawrence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy investigates many of the same issues concerning the 
alteration of the past through the act of remembering.  The scene in Sterne’s novel depicting 
Slawkenbergius’ tale is a crucial moment in the text that illustrates both the revisionary aspects 
of recall as well as the unique ways in which this occurs within the context of collective memory.  
In the tale, the narrator relays the story of a stranger whose unusually large nose attracts the 
attention of the townspeople of Strasbug.  Only witnessed by a handful of people in the town 
before his departure, the stranger’s nose becomes the obsession of the entire city as the 
townspeople diligently attempt to reconstruct a unified, retrospective description of the nose.  
The trouble begins for the town, however, once the stranger leaves Strasburg and the handful of 
eye-witnesses are forced to reconstruct a description of the nose based off of their personal 
recollections: 
  “’tis a nose, said the centinel, like my own. 
 ——I heard it crackle, said the drummer. 
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By dunder, said the centinel, I saw it bleed. 
             What a pity, cried the bandy-legg’d drummer, we did not both touch it!” (179) 
In this passage, the drummer and the centinel attempt to align their accounts of the stranger’s 
nose.  The centinel believes the nose was “like my own” and that he “saw it bleed,” whereas the 
drummer remembers that he “heard it crackle.”  In this first description of the stranger’s nose, 
although the centinel and drummer’s memories of the nose do not match up, they also do not 
necessarily contradict each other.  In fact, the stranger’s nose could be similar to the centinel’s 
and could indeed have both crackled and bled.  Later accounts from the trumpeter and his wife, 
however, add to the contradicting memories of the witnesses as the couple describes the sounds 
of the stranger’s sneeze as both “soft as a flute” and as “a brazen nose” sounding like “brass” 
(179).  It is also interesting to note that up to this point, each of the accounts of the nose reflect 
the various personal biases of the witnesses.  For instance, the centinel’s comment that he saw 
the stranger’s nose bleed, or the drummer and musical couple’s comments about the various 
sounds the nose makes harken back to the personal biases that feed into reconstructions of 
memories.  Not only do the witnesses use language both specific and accessible to their various 
personal backgrounds and occupations, but their accounts highlight how personal biases affect 
the types of details that are remembered.  
In addition to the previous accounts of the stranger’s nose which emphasize not only that 
memories are unreliable and inherently changed, the final two witnesses, the inn-keeper and his 
wife, not only add to the conflicting remembrances of the appendage but they help to outline the 
revisionary process: 
  ’Tis an imposture, my dear, said the master of the inn——’tis a false nose.—— 
      ’Tis a true nose, said his wife.—— 
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      ’Tis made of fir-tree, said he,——I smell the turpentine.—— 
      There’s a pimple on it, said she. 
     ’Tis a dead nose, replied the inn-keeper. 
 ’Tis a live nose, and if I am alive myself, said the inn-keeper’s wife, I will touch         
it.” (181) 
Like the previous witnesses, the inn-keeper and his wife are also unable to reconcile their 
memory of the stranger’s nose.  For the inn-keeper the nose is an “imposture” or a trick, possibly 
a prosthetic apparatus “made of fir-tree,” which he then links to his sense of smell when he 
mentions, “I smell the turpentine.” Therefore, for the master of the inn, the stranger’s nose is a 
“false nose” and a “dead nose.”  For his wife, however, the stranger’s nose is remembered as 
both a “true nose” and “a live nose,” further evidenced by her remark, “There’s a pimple on it.”  
Furthermore, traditionally understood as a phallic symbol, the inn-keeper’s wife’s statement, “I 
will touch it” hints at the stranger’s appendage not only as a penis, but one quite literally full of 
life.  Not only do the inn-keeper and his wife’s remembrances of the nose drastically differ, but 
they build off of one another and are revised in accordance with their corresponding responses.  
For instance, in both statements made by the inn-keeper that the nose is “a false nose” and a 
“dead nose,” his wife replies with the opposing statements, “‘Tis a true nose” and a “live nose.”  
Additionally, for each time that the inn-keeper tries to suggest that the stranger’s nose is fake or 
whittled out of wood, his wife counters his remarks both with her account that she notices a 
pimple on the nose as well as her insistence on touching it.  Like in the case of the inn-keeper 
and his wife, not only do the townspeople’s accounts differ, but in many cases they contradict 
each other and build off of previous responses in order to craft their own depictions.  In this way, 
readers notice not only the revision taking place in the memory of each of the witnesses, but also 
their inability to recreate a unified description of the stranger’s nose. 
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Further evidencing how Slawkenbergius’ tale supports the theory of memory as 
revisionary, the narrator expresses that the obsession with reconstructing the description of the 
nose extends far beyond the initial six eye-witnesses. The story continues,  “queen Mab, like an 
elf as she was, had taken the stranger’s nose, and without reduction of its bulk, had that night 
been at the pains of slitting and dividing it into as many noses of different cuts and fashions, as 
there were heads in Strasburg to hold them” (183).  This moment in the tale reinforces the 
unreliability of memory as it adds a plethora of possible descriptions and imaginings of the nose 
to the existing contradictory eye-witness accounts.  The narrator suggests that now, in addition to 
the initial six accounts, the city-wide dream has succeeded in producing “as many noses of 
different cuts and fashions, as there were heads is Strasburg to hold them.”  The invocation of 
Queen Mab as well as the setting of a dream symbolizes the dream-like fallibility of memory-
based reconstructions, as well as hints at the possibility that like a dream, memory is oftentimes 
only remembered in lingering fragments that can never be wholly reconstructed.  Additionally, 
the narrator’s use of the phrase, “slitting and dividing” further illustrates Proust’s theory of 
memory by demonstrating the revisionary aspects of memory and its ability to separate or pull 
apart reality from fiction and create multiple versions of the past.   
4. Environmental Influences on Memory: John Locke in Tristram Shandy 
 Transitioning away from Slawkenbergius’ tale as an illustration of the fallible and 
revisionary nature of memory, I propose that in Tristram Shandy, revisionary memory not only 
occurs naturally, but that it is spurred and even heightened according to the environment in 
which recall is evoked.  In order to understand the crucial role that an overloaded environment 
plays in memory reconstruction, it is important to first look at two key concepts that both 
enhance and limit short-term memory: working memory and chunking.  In his book, Essentials 
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of Human Memory, Alan D. Baddeley defines working memory as “a system that allowed 
several pieces of information to be held in mind at the same time” (45, 6).  Although distinct 
from short-term memory, working memory oftentimes operates in conjunction with short-term 
memory in order to process and update information input.  One aspect of working memory that 
must be taken into consideration, however, is its limitations.  Psychologist George Miller 
explains these shortcomings, when he writes, “The span of immediate memory impose severe 
limitations on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and remember. By 
organizing the stimulus input simultaneously into several dimensions and successively into a 
sequence or chunks, we manage to break (or at least stretch) this informational bottleneck” (n.p.).  
Miller further suggests that seven, plus or minus two, is the magic range in terms of 
remembering.  Lehrer simplifies Miller’s idea further when he writes, “Miller’s idea was simple: 
the mind has limits.  Our short-term memory, Miller said, can only contain about seven random 
bits before forgetfulness begins to intrude.  This is why all the random labels in our life, from 
phone numbers to license plates to Social Security numbers, are limited to seven digits” (159).  
Once working memory reaches retention levels and is asked to exceed them, memory becomes 
overloaded and, thus, is susceptible to forgetting and revision. Considering these limitations on 
memory, Baddeley also argues that one way the brain attempts to retain information and manage 
overload is through the process of chunking.  According to Fonollosa et. al., “A chunk is often 
defined as a collection of elements having strong associations with each other, but weaker 
associations with elements within other chunks” (n.p.). To illustrate this concept, Baddeley 
provides the following example: 
The capacity of immediate memory is determined by the number of chunks rather 
than by the number of digits…Try reading off and repeating back the following 
sequence of letters: I A R F T S K B G N I.  Were you able to repeat it correctly? 
Cave 11 
 
If you were, you have a remarkably good immediate memory.  Now try the next 
sequence, which in fact comprises exactly the same letters: F R I K B A S T I N 
G.  No prizes for getting that one correct (24). 
Baddeley’s example clearly delineates how organizing smaller strands of information into 
coherent chunks helps the brain store and recall information not only longer, but more 
accurately.  Where most people are unable to recite and remember the first sequence due to its 
incoherent or random arrangement, the second sequence is much easier to remember because it 
has been organized into manageable chunks: “FRIK” and “BASTING.”  Additionally, the second 
ordering is easier to remember not only because it is broken into two distinct chunks, but because 
the second chunk, “BASTING,” is a familiar word with attributed meaning.  Therefore, chunking 
functions alongside working memory to help facilitate both retention and recall1.  
 Sterne not only depicts the revisionist nature of memory, but he also suggests an 
environment where memory is prime for alteration.  Early in the novel, readers encounter a 
conversation between the narrating Tristram and an unnamed “Critick” concerning the 
philosophy of John Locke.  Utilizing the previously mentioned metaphor of the mind as hot wax 
on which memories are imprinted, Tristram and the Critick debate over the malleability and 
instability of memory as well as the environment surrounding the creation and reconstruction of 
those memories.  On this subject Tristram outlines three scenarios where memory is at the 
highest risk of being modified: “dull organs, dear Sir, in the first place.  Secondly, slight and 
transient impressions made by objects when the said organs are not dull.  And, thirdly, a memory 
unto a sieve, not able to retain what it has received” (61).  It is important to note that two of the 
scenarios deal explicitly with the individual, whereas one condition directly concerns the 
                                                          
1 Retention and recall a part of the three distinct stages of memory: encoding, storage, and 
retrieval.  Retention relates specifically to encoding and storage, whereas recall deals explicitly 
with retrieval (Phelps 11). 
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environment.  However, as I will demonstrate later, the two scenarios involving the individual 
can easily be influenced by environmental conditions. In addition to outlining these various 
situations, Tristram goes a step further by modeling a scenario where memory would be forced 
into revision.  Bearing the wax metaphor2 in mind, Tristram explains: 
When this is melted and dropp’d upon the letter,——if Dolly fumbles too long for 
her thimble, till the wax is over harden’d, it will not receive the mark of her 
thimble from the usual impulse which was wont to imprint it.  Very well: If 
Dolly’s wax, for want of better, is bees-wax or of a temper too soft,——tho’ it 
may receive,——it will not hold the impression, how hard soever Dolly thrusts 
against it; and last of all, supposing the wax good, and eke the thimble, but 
applied thereto in careless haste, as her Mistress rings the bell;——in any one of 
these three cases, the print, left by the thimble, will be as unlike the prototype as a 
brass-jack. (61-2) 
In his model, Tristram hypothesizes the outcomes of each of the three scenarios concerning 
memory.  In the first situation, Dolly “fumbles too long for her thimble,” causing the wax to 
become “over harden’d.”  In the second scenario, Dolly uses bees-wax that is “of a temper too 
soft,” and finds that “it will not hold the impression.”  The final situation explains that Dolly’s 
“Mistress rings the bell” and, therefore, the impression is “applied thereto in careless haste.” 
Although the first two situations do not explicitly deal with the environment surrounding 
retention or recall, the final example highlights the effects of distraction and memory overload in 
Dolly’s inability to create a strong impression. In each scenario, the outcome of the wax imprint 
is the same—each is as “unlike the prototype as a brass-jack.”  This resulting imprint further 
exemplifies not only that the imprint is revised in some way, but it points to the inherent 
fallibility of memory and its inability to reproduce the original.  Tristram’s example also 
                                                          
2 Borrowing the wax metaphor from earlier scholars such as Plato and John Locke, I return once 
again to Alexander Gerard’s An Essay on Genius to give a clearer example of the metaphor, “the 
memory is of such a happy temperature as may be compared to wax, which receives the seal 




illustrates that under certain moments of distraction or environmental pressures —such as 
Dolly’s mistress ringing the bell— working memory can become overloaded and cause 
significant alterations in the various stages of memory.  In each case, the imprint left in the wax 
resembles the original, but is nonetheless changed in some way.  Thus, Tristram’s model creates 
hypothetical environments where working memory is severely inhibited and pushed towards 
revision in order to recreate some semblance of the original. 
5. The Forgetful Maid: The Environment of Recall 
 Narrating the hectic moment of this birth and subsequent naming, Tristram models the 
prime environment for revision by illustrating the role that overloaded memory plays in the 
chambermaid’s retention and recall abilities.  Fearing that the child is dead upon birth, Mrs. 
Shandy’s chambermaid, Susannah, is sent to ask Mr. Shandy what the child is to be named so 
that the baby can be christened before death.  Tristram recounts the events: 
Then reach me my breeches off the chair, said my father to Susannah——There is 
not a moment’s time to dress you, Sir, cried Susannah——the child is as black in 
the face as my——As your, what?...——Bless me, Sir, said Susannah, the child’s 
in a fit——And where’s Mr. Yorick——Never where he should be, said 
Susannah, but his curate’s in the dressing-room, with the child upon his arm, 
waiting for the name——and my mistress bid me run as fast as I could to know—
…. I’ll get up——There is no time, cried Susannah, the child’s as black as my 
shoe. Trismegistus, said my father——But stay——thou art a leaky vessel, 
Susannah, added my father; canst thou carry Trismegistus in thy head, the length 
of the gallery without scattering——Can I? cried Susannah, shutting the door in a 
huff…. Susannah got the start, and kept it——’Tis Tris——something, cried 
Susannah——There is no Christian name in the world, said the curate beginning 
with Tris——but Tristram.  Then ’tis Tristramgistus, quoth Susannah. (207, 8) 
In this passage, Tristram draws attention to the environment in which Susannah is tasked with 
remembering and recalling a variety of details.  Utilizing this scene, I will investigate three 
important aspects of environmentally-induced memory overload in order to show how these 
environments not only inhibit, but also revise memory. 
Cave 14 
 
5.1 Emotional Overload: Stress and Anxiety 
In this scene depicting Susannah, Sterne’s novel calls attention to the breakdown of 
memory under conditions of emotional overload.  Enveloped in an extreme state of anxiety 
caused by the impending death of the baby, Susannah enters into the stages of memory heavily 
influenced by environmental stress.  Marked by the phrases, “There is not a moment’s time,” 
“my mistress bid me run as fast as I could,” and “There is no time,” Sterne’s narrator emphasizes 
the sense of urgency in which Susannah operates.  Repeating the words, “cried Susannah,” four 
times throughout the passage, the narrator further cues the reader into Susannah’s emotional state 
by showing that the maid is not only a player in the stressful situation, but that she is heavily 
influenced by it. The sense of rapid movement implied by the phrases, “run as fast as I could, 
and “shutting the door in a huff,” also lend to the urgency of the moment.  Furthermore, by 
showing that Susannah is moving within rooms and down the “length of the gallery,” Sterne 
highlights a sense of spatial movement that in turn gives readers an idea of the complexity of 
Susannah’s task.  Elizabeth A. Phelps lends some helpful information regarding emotional states 
and memory in her description of traditionally held views of emotionally-saturated memories, 
“One of the most frequently cited qualities of memories of highly emotional events is their 
perceived vividness and detail. Which is often assumed to reflect memory accuracy” (8).  As 
Phelps suggests, it has been commonly accepted that memories occurring under heightened 
emotional states are both better committed to memory and more accurately remembered.  
Moving away from this traditional view, however, Phelps argues that emotional environments 
play a crucial role in the revision of memories: 
One of the primary ways emotion alters memory encoding is through influencing 
attention and perception, thus, changing what information comes into memory.  
Emotion has two distinct but related effects on attention and perception.  Emotion 
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enhances attention and perception for some central aspects of the emotional event, 
and it impairs attention to other, nonemotional components of the event.” (12) 
Thus, Phelps posits that although emotionally overloaded environments may cause certain 
aspects of the past to become more vivid, this also results in other portions of the memory being 
heavily revised or removed altogether.  By bringing certain details into focus, emotionally 
imprinted memories also blur and abstract other details, therefore, causing an alteration of the 
past.  For Susannah, the environmental stress causes her to recall certain details such as the child 
being as “black as my shoe” or the location of the curate, but it also contributes ultimately to her 
inability to recall the child’s name. 
5.2 Informational Overload: Dual-task Performance and Chunking 
In addition to the emotionally overloaded environment Susannah faces, she also 
experiences an informational overload that directly influences her memory capacities. 
Considering Miller’s seven plus or minus two rule as a limitation on working memory, the 
Susannah scene in Sterne’s novel showcases a moment where this accepted range is reached and 
far-surpassed.  In addition to the overall sense of urgency characterized by this scene, Susannah’s 
working memory is challenged as she is forced to perform the dual task of remembering and 
recalling simultaneously.  This is illustrated in the passage when Susannah is asked to recall 
information to answer questions such as “where’s Mr. Yorick,” or to remember the color of the 
dying baby so that she can fulfill Mr. Shandy’s request for a comparison, which she eventually 
fulfills.  Not only is Susannah charged with recalling memories in order to meet Mr. Shandy’s 
demands, but she is also responsible for committing the name “Trismegistus” to memory long 
enough to report it back to the curate.  Tasked with remembering a twelve-letter long name, 
Susannah faces the limitations of Miller’s rule and is forced to resort to chunking in hopes of 
remembering the name.  Returning to Baddeley, he argues that “One factor that assists chunking 
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is the redundancy, or predictability, of the material” (25).  Furthermore, Pertti Sarriluoma 
suggests that when considering chunking, it is important to recognize that there are three 
dimensions that play into one’s ability to successfully chunk information and later remember it: 
“These aspects are the number of chunks, their size, and finally the relevance of their content.  If 
one of these dimensions is neglected, the outcome of the training will not be satisfactory” (131).  
Considering both Baddeley and Sarriluoma’s dimensions of memory chunking, readers quickly 
realize that in trying to remember “Trismegistus,” Susannah is immediately disadvantaged.  Not 
only does the name defy the principals of redundancy and predictability, seeing as there is “no 
Christian name in the world…beginning with Tris,” but the name also requires several small and 
unintelligible chunks.  Unlike the chunking earlier illustrated by the sequence 
“FRIKBASTING,” the name Susannah is given does not easily break into manageable or 
intelligible chunks.  Therefore, due in part to the dual-tasks that Susannah is asked to perform, as 
well as her inability to effectively break the name into relevant and intelligible chunks, the maid 
is ultimately forced into a state of revision when recalling the baby’s name.  
5.3 Influential Overload: Outside Influence and Superimposed Brain Folds 
The final environmental aspect that interferes with and causes the revision of memories is 
that of outside influence.  Karen J. Mitchell and Maria S. Zaragoza suggest, “It is now well 
established that even single exposures to misinformation can result in genuine false memories for 
suggested events” (246).  In Susannah’s case, the curate’s comment that “there is no Christian 
name in the world…beginning with Tris—but Tristram” offers such an instance of 
misinformation (208).  Under the influence of the curate’s comment, Susannah revises the name 
originally given to her.  In addition to the environments of emotional and informational overload, 
Susannah’s memory is furthered altered by the misinformation of others.  Furthermore, using the 
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scholarship of Descartes and L’Homme, John Sutton explains that one commonly held belief 
about the structure of the brain helps to explain how Susannah’s memories might be altered by 
outside influence.  Summarizing Descartes and L’Homme’s philosophy, Sutton explains that one 
way of viewing the interworkings of the brain and memory is through the explanation that the 
“animal spirits” move through the brain tissue and create special patterns within the brain folds 
that corresponded to specific memories.  Sutton elaborates:  
All this is accomplished…by means of the whooshing animal spirits, shaking 
through brain tissues.  The spirits incessantly undergo criblage or tamisage 
(sifting, filtering, sieving) in the textured porous net, forming and retracing 
patterns across the inner surfaces of a filamentous mesh.  They connect the 
deepest interior, the pineal gland, to the world in numerous ways. (56)   
Sutton’s use of the words “sifting, filtering, sieving” suggest a free movement of these animal 
spirits throughout the brain and hint at their ability to create new impressions in different regions.  
Sutton later comments that this motion of the fluids “is itself altered over time” (58) and that 
eventually these “Spirits fold, enlarge, bend, and arrange the relevant fibres of the brain 
substances into forms” (59) that oftentimes do not resembled their original shape.  More simply 
stated, the animal spirits create distinct memory patterns in the brain folds but as those memories 
are recalled or influenced in some way, a new pattern is not only created, but superimposed over 
the old one.  Hence, the new memory is influenced and altered by the resulting two overlapping 
patterns.  With this in mind, it becomes easier to understand how the curate’s comment interferes 
with Susannah’s memory by superimposing a new memory over the original one and causing her 
to forget the name Mr. Shandy originally tells her.  Thus, in the scene depicting Susannah’s 
memory task, Sterne’s novel shows how various environmental factors such as emotional, 





 Whether through the revision of memory in Slawkenbergius’ tale, or through the 
alteration that takes place as a result of the environment surrounding Tristram’s naming, Sterne’s 
text grapples with many of the same theories of memory that Marcel Proust later outlined in his 
writing.  Postulating memory as fabricated and deeply erroneous, Proustian memory spills over 
into the Sterne’s text in a way that illuminates exciting new ways of understating how the brain 
and memory operate.  In Laurence Sterne’s novel, Tristram Shandy, Sterne explores the 
revisionary nature of memory as well as the role that environment plays in recall in order to 
show that human memory is unreliable and many times incoherent.  In his attempts to reconstruct 
the events surrounding his conception and early childhood, Sterne’s narrator not only points to 
the difficulties in regenerating reality, but he uncovers some of the limitations of autobiography 
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